Damasio attempts to describe a framework in which we may hope to better understand what it is that makes us conscious, able to feel, and aware of our bodies while feeling and emulating others. He does so by describing different components of the brain, their functions and how they might relate to consciousness with fair examples. Very early in Self Comes to Mind however, Damasio admits he has no working definition of Consciousness:
- To better understand Demasio’s Framework what do you believe his definition would be of consciousness? What is yours?
We read some children are born without major components of their brains not functioning, in which their attitudes resemble that of infants where they exhibit simple pleasures and pains but aren’t capable higher order brain functions:
- If a child’s brain is largely developed at birth what gives it an autobiographical self and when? Are there limits to the levels of self of a disabled individual with neurological illness? What might be the ethical or moral consequences of defining these levels as Demasio has in his framwork?
Demasio and Hustvedt both offer examples of their personal experiments, experience and theory as well as those of others to determine what it means to be who we are.
- What are the differences and similarities between their two approaches? What aspects of each do you agree/disagree with?
I think the reason Damasio uses a “framework” is because he does not want to define or categorize consciousness in an absolute or monolithic way. Nevertheless, I think he believes consciousness is an evolutionary development from the brain stem (primordial feelings/responses), which aims for self-preservation in an increasingly complex sociocultural/biological world. Neurology is certainly not my forte but Damasio’s argument seems strong to me. I certainly agree that Cartesian dualism represents a false dichotomy. Indeed I believe that consciousness is an embodied rather than a purely transcendental phenomenon.
In response to your comment about Damasio’s description of “disabled” children and conceptions of the self, I think sometimes Damasio’s theories align with an ethics/politics of disability studies and other times I’m not sure. In the passage on children afflicted with hydranemcephaly, Damasio seems to be making the argument that these children are more aware/cognizant than previously imaged. Also, he draws attention to the importance of bodily sensation and emphasizes the corporealness of consciousness. However, I see your point, if these children haven’t developed “autobiographical selves” does that mean they are less evolved than “normal” children?
Damasio and Hustvedt’s methods are similar and both texts provide great material for a liberal studies class. Both authors seem committed to redefining the realm of neurology. Both incorporate political, literary and philosophical content to their analysis in an unconventional and creative way. In addition both authors resist portraying the self, the body or the brain in a reductionist manner.